Los Angeles snapshot — price movement +7.7% and rental regulation

[yuki_hope]

The 36-day marketing period is what makes me hesitate over this Los Angeles sample. The properties are advertised from $712,000 to $1,068,000, and asking prices appear to have moved 7.7%, but I am not sure the units compete with one another closely enough for that figure to mean much.

Rental restrictions may split buyers rather than produce a consistent discount: someone relying on rental income could walk away, while an owner-occupier might barely price the issue. Financing, fresh-listing volume and neighbourhood boundaries could create further differences. Would you test the 7.7% against completed sales first, or separate the properties by intended use and location before looking at price movement?

 

[xavi_flint]

A buyer who sees rental restrictions as central to the intended use may not negotiate at all; the property can simply fall out of the comparison set. That means the 36-day figure could hide two groups: suitable units that transact normally and unsuitable ones that linger or are withdrawn. I’d separate completed, reduced and withdrawn listings before interpreting +7.7% as market movement.

 

[anika_vale]

What do you mean by “serviced apartments” in this sample? Are they being marketed with existing occupants, as furnished units for flexible stays, or just with building services? That distinction could change what buyers worry about. Neighbourhood boundaries also matter in Los Angeles, so a citywide sample at this size may be mixing markets that do not compete directly.

 

[anika_vale]

I’d also want the dates behind the +7.7%. If it compares current asking prices with earlier asking prices, it says less than a comparison of recent completed sales. Financing and condition can distort this bracket too. A renovated unit that attracts a financed owner-occupier is not necessarily comparable with one bought mainly for rental use.

 

[bright_blueprint]

I’m not convinced regulation automatically produces a negotiable discount. A motivated seller might accept one, but another seller may wait for a buyer whose plans fit the property. Look at when price cuts occur and whether they follow a long marketing period. If affected listings are withdrawn rather than reduced, there may be no observable “regulation discount” in the completed-sales data.

 

[iris_shore]

I see the argument that regulation may not create a visible discount, but I would not stop at completed sales. Withdrawals could be where the effect shows up.

I’d record each listing’s neighbourhood, condition, stated occupancy or intended use, original ask, reduction date, outcome, financing clues and marketing time. That allows genuinely competing units to be grouped while keeping withdrawn properties in view. For any serious candidate, the rental position can then be checked locally against the buyer’s intended use rather than inferred from the wider sample.